Evolutionary Justification of Plagiarism by Karpov, Alexander
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Evolutionary Justification of Plagiarism
Alexander Karpov
National Research University Higher School of Economics
April 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70976/
MPRA Paper No. 70976, posted 28 April 2016 13:19 UTC
Evolutionary Justification of Plagiarism 
Alexander Karpov1 
 
National Research University Higher School of Economics 
E-mail: akarpov@hse.ru 
Postal address: National Research University Higher School of Economics, Department of Economics, 
Myasnitskaya str. 20, 101000 Moscow, Russia 
 
 
This paper provides evolutionary game theoretic model of plagiarism. The paper finds the relationship 
between author effort, publication value, and the frequency of plagiarism. There are two types of 
equilibria. Plagiarist-free equilibria are neutrally stable. The only evolutionary stable state is characterized 
by a positive share of plagiarists. 
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 1. Introduction 
Plagiarism is a form of scientific misconduct. The number of scientific retractions caused 
by plagiarism has shown an increasing trend in recent decades (Fang et. al. 2012; Steen et. al. 
2013). Among 3,247 scientists surveyed anonymously in the United States, 1.4% admitted to 
plagiarism (Martinson et.al. 2005). In many other countries, the rate of plagiarism is even higher 
(Fang et. al. 2012; Zhang, Grieneisen 2013). 
There are several papers on the economics of plagiarism. Quandt (2012) developed the 
aggregate demand for plagiarism modeling a plagiarism detection process. Arce et. al. (2008) 
provided a game with incomplete information about an editor’s preferred response to a case of 
plagiarism that captures key features of the submission process. Haeussler et.al. (2014) modeled 
unethical behavior in the context of information sharing among competing academic researchers. 
Hoover (2006) developed a game-theoretic model of author-plagiarist interaction. The model 
shows that current incentives in the profession result in plagiarism. 
Plagiarism appears to be an inherently social and interactive phenomenon, with both 
incentives and punishment for plagiarizing coming from one’s scientific peers. Thus, one of the 
most significant incentives for plagiarism appears to be the growing pressure to publish (Necker 
2014) as the key to recognition and survival in the increasingly competitive and hostile 
environment of one’s scientific community. In fact, these general features and the very appeal to 
‘publish or perish’ prompt to rethink plagiarism in evolutionary terms. 
This paper provides an evolutionary model of author-plagiarist interaction. The model 
captures plagiarism as a group phenomenon, following the evolutionary patterns of imitation, 
and inheritance. In fact, the identity of players is not stable: the same player can be an author or a 
plagiarist in different time periods. Players inherit norms from their colleagues. There is no pure 
equilibrium. Only a small fraction of papers is plagiarized. 
 
 
2. Model 
 
This section develops an evolutionary model. There is a population of adaptive agents. 
There are two possible strategies, the Author and the Plagiarist. All agents are randomly paired 
in each period. Following Hoover’s (2006) model we define P - publication value, E – the 
Author’s effort to publish paper, e – the Plagiarist’s effort to create the work (E>e), δ - loss of 
citations (because the Plagiarist’s paper has a certain number of citations). Table 1 describes all 
possible interactions. The Author-Plagiarist cell is obtained from Hoover’s model solution for 
the case when the Author chooses not to fight to establish the case for plagiarism. The Author-
Author cell corresponds to Hoover’s model payoffs in the case of the Plagiarist who abstains 
from plagiarizing. The Plagiarist-Plagiarist cell is equal to zero. 
Table 1. Plagiarism game. Row’s Payoffs. 
 Plagiarist Author 
Plagiarist 0 P-e 
Author P-E-δ P-E 
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in a scientific community guarantees that no other 
strategy could invade the population of scholars. Because P-e>P-E and P-E-δ>0 there is no ESS 
with pure Author or Plagiarist strategies. Polymorphic population in which   is a share of 
authors is ESS if the expected payoff to being an Author 
  ∙ (  −  ) + (1 −  ) ∙ (P − E − δ) 
is equal to the expected payoff to being an Plagiarist 
  ∙ (P − e) + (1 −  ) ∙ 0. 
Equilibrium share of Authors is 
 ∗ = 1 −
E − e
P − e −  
. 
The share of Authors thus decreases with respect to Author effort. The same follows from 
empirical literature (Fang et. al. 2012; Zhang, Grieneisen 2013). Because Author effort is higher 
in non-English-language countries, the equilibrium share of Authors is higher in English-
language countries. 
The journal impact factor is a good proxy for publication value. Steen et al (2013) found 
that there is a negative correlation between impact factor and the number of plagiarism cases. In 
our model, the share of Authors increases with respect to the publication value which explains 
this empirical observation. 
 
 
2.1 Generalization 
 
Let P'=P-e and E'=E-e be normalized values of publication and author's effort. Let us 
introduce an additional strategy Author-Fighter. Author-Fighter represents an idea of collective 
punishment of plagiarists. The punishment of Plagiarists depends on the share of Author-
Fighters. 
Table 2. Plagiarism game. Row’s Payoffs. 
Share  Plagiarist Author Author-Fighter 
γ=1-α-β Plagiarist 0 P' P'(1- β) 
α Author P'-E'-δ P'-E' P'-E' 
β Author-Fighter P'-E'-δ(1-β) P'-E' P'-E' 
 
From Table 2 replicator dynamics equations are derived 
  
  
=  ((  −  )(−1 + 2  + 2  − 2   −    − 2   +     +   ) +  (  +   − 1)); 
 
  
  
=  (− (−1 + 2  + 2  − 2   −    − 2   +     +   ) +  (  +   − 1) + 
+ (−1 + 2  + 3  − 3   −    − 3   +     +   )); 
 
  
  
=  (− (  +   −    −    − 2   +     +   ) +  (  +  ) + 
+ (  +   − 2   −    − 2   +     +   )). 
Stable states are depicted in Fig. 1. Following Bowles (2006), I call stable states as 
Hobbesian and Rousseauian Equilibria. Hobbesian equilibrium is ESS with only Authors and 
Plagiarists. It is the case in scientific communities with low academic standards. Rousseauian 
Equilibria are NSS (Lyapunov neutrally stable state) with only Authors and Authors-Fighters. It 
is the case in scientific communities with high-academic standards. The population with 
Plagiarists and Authors-Fighters cannot be stable. 
Rousseauian Equilibria is based on collective punishment of plagiarists. It is not ESS, but 
only NSS. It is hard to support it. Evolutionary drift disturbs the equilibrium. Taking into 
account stochastic events (evolutionary drift) in the long run the population would spend most of 
its time in the neighborhood of the Hobbesian equilibrium. Additional institutions such as group 
competition, second-order punishment (to punish Authors who tolerate Plagiarists), conformist 
cultural transmission (Bowles, 2006) are needed. 
  
  
Figure 1. Phase plot for Plagiarism game (P'=4, E'=2, δ=1). 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The paper explains the huge variation in frequencies of plagiarism cases in different 
countries, scientific communities. The crucial role in the fight against plagiarists is collective 
punishment. There exist equilibria without plagiarists, but they are only neutrally stable. There 
exists unique ESS, which is characterized by a positive share of plagiarists. A variety of 
frequencies of plagiarism can be explained by the difference in Author effort between non-
English-language countries and English-language countries, and by difference in publication 
value. 
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